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E conomists have made use of, and have contributed to the development of, many branches of moral theory, including utilitarianism, social contract theory, libertarianism, and maximin and capability theories of justice. In 
contrast, virtue ethics —the study of moral character—has been an important 
strand in moral philosophy for literally thousands of years, but has received little 
attention from contemporary economists. That neglect has not been reciprocated. 
A signifi cant body of philosophical work in virtue ethics is associated with a radical 
critique of the market economy and of economics. Expressed crudely, the charge 
sheet is this: The market depends on instrumental rationality and extrinsic moti-
vation; market interactions therefore fail to respect the internal value of human 
practices and the intrinsic motivations of human actors; by using market exchange 
as its central model, economics normalizes extrinsic motivation, not only in markets 
but also (in its ventures into the territories of other social sciences) in social life 
more generally; therefore economics is complicit in an assault on virtue and on 
human fl ourishing. We will argue that this critique is fl awed, both as a descrip-
tion of how markets actually work and as a representation of how classical and 
neo classical economists have understood the market. We will show how the market 
and economics can be defended against the critique from virtue ethics.
Crucially, our response to that critique will be constructed using the language 
and logic of virtue ethics. In this respect, it is fundamentally different from a response 
that many economists would fi nd more natural—to point to the enormous benefi ts, 
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including income and leisure that can be devoted to intrinsically motivated activi-
ties, that we all enjoy as a result of the workings of markets, and to the essential role 
of economics in explaining how markets work. Set against those benefi ts, it can be 
argued, questions about whether market motivations are virtuous are second-order 
concerns that economists can safely leave to moral philosophers. Thus, for example, 
responding to the philosopher Michael Sandel’s objection to markets in carbon 
dioxide emissions on the grounds that they express nonvirtuous attitudes to the 
environment (Sandel 2012, pp. 72–76), Coyle (2012) writes, “I would rather see an 
effective scheme to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but then I’m an economist.” 
We are economists too, and have some sympathy with such sentiments. Neverthe-
less, the virtue-ethical critique of economics is gaining credence in public debate. 
Many people see it as providing intellectual support for popular attitudes of opposi-
tion to capitalism and globalization, and of hostility to economics as a discipline. 
Philosophically, the critique is grounded in an ancient and respected tradition of 
ethical thought: it is not something that economics can or should simply brush 
aside. Our premise is that economics needs a response to this critique that takes 
virtue ethics seriously.
Another possible reply, made for example by van Staveren (2009) and Besley 
(2013), is that, in their critique of economics, the virtue ethicists fail to recognize 
the diversity of the discipline. Economics has never been unanimous or uncon-
ditional in advocating markets; indeed, it is possible to read the development 
of normative economics in terms of a continually expanding catalog of market 
failures and their remedies. In particular, a recent development in economics 
has been the growth of a literature in which concepts of intrinsic motivation are 
used to explain individual behavior. Although this work is not explicitly virtue-
ethical in the normative sense, it allows economics to model a “crowding-out” 
mechanism that is similar to the virtue ethicists’ account of the corrupting effects 
of markets. However, pointing to the diversity of economics merely defl ects the 
virtue-ethical critique from economics in general to a particular but surely major 
tradition of economic thought—that liberal tradition that understands the market 
as a domain in which socially desirable consequences emerge from the pursuit of 
private interests. In contrast, our response meets the critique head-on. We aim to 
show that economists can teach about and defend the market without standing for 
nonvirtue against virtue.1
The logic of our response requires that we use the modes of argument of virtue 
ethics. We write as philosophically and historically inclined economists, hoping to 
be read both by philosophers and by our fellow economists. For the benefi t of the 
economists and with apologies to the philosophers, we assume no prior knowledge 
of virtue ethics on the part of the reader. Thus, we begin with a brief introduction 
1 In this respect, our approach has more in common with McCloskey’s (2006) account of the “bourgeois 
virtues.” However, our analysis is more systematic and economics-specifi c than McCloskey’s imagina-
tive but discursive exploration of the seven virtues of traditional Christian thought and their role in 
economic life.
Luigino Bruni and Robert Sugden     143
to virtue ethics. We then describe some prominent critiques of the market that are 
grounded in virtue ethics and in the related economic and psychological literature 
on intrinsic motivation.
Following this introduction, we use the methods of virtue ethics to develop a 
conception of market virtue that is consistent with many classical and neo classical 
economists’ accounts of how markets work and of what purposes they serve. Our 
central idea is that the public benefi ts of markets should be understood as the 
aggregate of the mutual benefi ts gained by individuals as parties to voluntary trans-
actions, and that the market virtues are dispositions that are directed at this kind 
of mutual benefi t. For a virtuous market participant, mutual benefi t is not just a 
fortunate by-product of the individual pursuit of self-interest: he or she intends that 
transactions with others are mutually benefi cial.
Using this idea, we identify some specifi c character traits that have the status 
of virtues within the domain of the market. Our list of market virtues (which we do 
not claim is complete) includes universality, enterprise and alertness, respect for the 
tastes of one’s trading partners, trust and trustworthiness, acceptance of competition, 
self-help, non-rivalry, and stoicism about reward. We will argue that these market 
virtues, grounded on ideas of reciprocity and mutual benefi t, are closely associated 
with virtues of civil society more generally. It is therefore a mistake to think that the 
market is a virtue-free zone, or that the character traits that best equip individuals to 
fl ourish in markets are necessarily corrosive of virtue in other domains of life.
The idea that economic agents should understand their interactions as mutual 
assistance is characteristic of a tradition of natural-law philosophy from which 
mainstream economic thought turned away in the later eighteenth century. Never-
theless, as we will show, the idea that mutual benefi t is in some sense the purpose of 
the market is implicit in the writings of many major economists from the eighteenth 
century to the present day. The specifi c market virtues that we present feature in 
some canonical accounts of the desirable properties of markets. In this sense, our 
paper can also be read as an attempt to reconstruct a submerged current of virtue-
ethical thought in economics.
What is Virtue Ethics?
The central concern of virtue ethics, broadly interpreted, is with moral character— 
with what sort of person one is and should be. Virtues are acquired character traits 
or dispositions that are judged to be good. Crucially, virtues are not judged to be 
good because they tend to induce actions that, for other moral reasons, are good or 
right. In virtue ethics, actions are judged to be good because they are in character 
for a virtuous person—they are constitutive of living well, of “fl ourishing.” A morally 
well-constituted individual cultivates virtues not as rules of thumb for moral action, 
but because such virtues are characteristic of the kind of person she is or wants to be.
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (c.  350 BC [1980]) is traditionally seen as the 
founding text of virtue ethics. Aristotle’s account of virtue begins from the idea that 
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within any “practice” or domain of life, goodness is understood in relation to the telos 
(literally, “end” or “purpose”) of that domain—“that for whose sake everything is 
done.” For example, Aristotle (Book 1, section 1) treats medicine as a domain whose 
telos is “health” and military strategy as a domain whose telos is “victory.” In relation to 
a given domain, an acquired character trait is a virtue to the extent that the person 
who possesses it is thereby better able to contribute to the telos of that domain. The 
underlying idea is that human happiness or fl ourishing (eudaimonia) requires that 
people are oriented towards their various activities in ways that respect the intrinsic 
ends of the domains to which those activities belong.
How is the telos of a domain determined? Aristotle seems to think of the telos 
as a natural fact that can be ascertained by intuition, but many modern virtue ethi-
cists favor a communitarian approach. This approach, exemplifi ed by the work of 
MacIntyre (1984), understands the concept of fl ourishing as internal to specifi c 
communities and cultural traditions. Thus, to identify the telos of a practice, one 
must discover the meaning of that practice within the community of practitioners. 
In this view, a claim about the telos of an practice is not just the expression of a 
personal value judgement; it involves some (perhaps creative) interpretation of 
what is already there (Sandel 2009, pp. 184 –192, 203 –207; Anderson 1993, p. 143). 
As Sandel (p. 98) puts it, “we identify the norms appropriate to social practices by 
trying to grasp the characteristic end, or purpose, of those practices.”
There is much common ground between Aristotelian virtue ethics, with its 
emphasis on the intrinsic value of practices, and those strands of modern “positive 
psychology” that emphasise the importance of intrinsic motivation for human happi-
ness, in particular the self-determination theory of Deci and Ryan (1985). In this theory, 
the analog of fl ourishing is a concept of psychological health or well-being. The core 
hypothesis is that individual autonomy is a source of psychological well-being, and 
thus that human fl ourishing is linked with authenticity and self-realization. In Ryan 
and Deci’s (2000) taxonomy of motivation, there is a continuum from “amotiva-
tion,” through increasingly autonomous forms of “extrinsic motivation,” to the full 
autonomy of “intrinsic motivation.” A person who is extrinsically motivated performs 
an activity “in order to obtain some separable outcome.” Extrinsic motivations can 
become more “internal” (and thereby more autonomous) to the extent that the 
individual has a sense of having chosen the objective on which he acts and endorsed 
its value. But an intrinsically motivated person performs an activity “for its inherent 
satisfactions rather than for some separable consequence”; such a person “is moved to 
act for the fun or challenge entailed rather than because of external prods, pressures, 
or rewards” (pp. 56–60). Thus, the analog of telos is the meaning that an individual 
attaches to an activity when he sees the activity as an end in itself.
The Instrumentality of the Market: The Critique from Virtue Ethics
In critiques of economics by virtue ethicists, a recurring theme is that markets 
rely on extrinsic and thereby nonvirtuous motivations. This idea can also be traced 
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back to Aristotle, who wrote (Book 1, §5): “The life of money-making is one under-
taken under compulsion, and we alth is evidently not the good we are seeking; 
for it is merely useful an d for the sake of something else.” This sentence makes 
two claims that are echoed in critiques of economics made by modern virtue ethi-
cists. The fi rst claim is that when individuals participate in markets, they show a lack 
of autonomy—they act under compulsion. The suggestion seems to be that a truly 
autonomous person would not need to seek wealth (perhaps because he would 
already have as much as he needed without having to seek for it).2 The second claim 
is that the motivation for economic activity is extrinsic and thereby of an inferior 
kind—the things that economic activity can achieve are merely useful and for the sake 
of something else.
Here, we will focus on how three prominent contemporary virtue ethicists apply 
these themes in their writings about economics and the market. Of these criticisms 
of the market, MacIntyre’s (1984) book After Virtue is the most radical. Taken literally, 
MacIntyre’s elegant despair has no real point of contact with modern economics. But 
precisely because it takes the critique of the instrumentality of markets to its logical 
conclusion, it offers a useful point of reference. MacIntyre (p.  187) presents an 
account of morality that is built on the concept of a practice. A practice is a “coherent 
and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity” which realizes 
“goods internal to that form of activity.” A practice has intrinsic ends, and internal 
standards of excellence that make sense in relation to those ends. Associated with 
the practice are certain acquired character traits that assist in the achievement of 
excellence, or in recognizing and internalizing communal understandings of the 
meaning of the practice. The traits can be viewed as the virtues of the practice.
For MacIntyre (1984), a person who fails to treat an activity as a practice with 
an internal end is failing to display virtue— either because the activity falls within a 
practice whose internal ends the person is failing to respect, or because the activity 
is of such a morally impoverished and instrumental kind that it is not a practice at 
all—MacIntyre’s (p. 187) questionable example of an activity that does not count as 
a practice is bricklaying. This way of thinking immediately makes markets morally 
suspect. The market motivation of creating goods for exchange confl icts with the idea 
that activities, or the goods that they realize, are ends in themselves. Thus, according 
to MacIntyre, the exposure of a practice to market forces is liable to corrupt its excel-
lences and virtues. MacIntyre does not quite claim that practices can never coexist 
with market exchange. For example, he maintains that portrait painting from the 
time of Giotto to that of Rembrandt was a practice with internal ends and standards 
of excellence. He recognizes that many excellent painters were also able to achieve 
(and presumably cared about) goods external to the practice of art, including the 
income they were able to earn from the sale of their services (pp. 189–190). The 
suggestion is that the corrupting tendencies of the market can be contained only 
2 In a witty account of the history of Western intellectuals’ criticisms of capitalism, Alan Kahan (2010, 
p. 31) presents the “Three Don’ts” of anti-capitalism. The fi rst is “Don’t make money (just have it)”.
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to the extent that individuals are at least partially motivated by the internal ends of 
practices (as, in MacIntyre’s account, the great painters were).
However, as MacIntyre (1984) recognizes, practices as he understands them 
are not, and cannot be, characteristic of ordinary economic life in the world in 
which we live. Treating the household as a paradigm case of communal life, he 
argues that “[o]ne of the key moments in the creation of modernity” occurs when 
production moves from the household to an impersonal domain of “means-ends 
relationships” (p. 227). This thought refl ects the presupposition that production 
for exchange belongs to the domain of external goods. The implication is that an 
economy of practices cannot make effective use of comparative advantage and the 
division of labor. MacIntyre’s ultimate response to economic reality is a yearning for 
an imagined and ill-defi ned economy of communal production somehow devoid of 
the hierarchical power relationships found in real historical economies.
Similar themes, developed in somewhat less unworldly forms, are prominent 
in the work of Anderson (1993) and Sandel (2009, 2012). These writers recognize, 
at times reluctantly, that markets are a necessary part of social organization. But 
they argue that the instrumental logic of markets is liable to corrupt virtues that are 
proper to other domains of social life, and that it is therefore appropriate for the 
state to impose limits on the scope of markets.
Thus, the fi rst sentence of Anderson’s Value in Ethics and Economics (1993) 
is: “Why not put everything up for sale?” This rhetorical question signals several 
elements of her position: to allow all areas of social life to be governed by market 
relationships would be morally objectionable; this truth ought to be obvious to 
a morally aware reader; but some opinion-formers do want to put everything up 
for sale, and their arguments need to be countered. More specifi cally, the people 
against whom she is arguing fail to understand that there are “ways we ought to value 
people and things that can’t be expressed through market norms” (pp. xi–xiii).
Anderson (1993) proposes a “pluralist theory of value” in which different kinds 
of goods ought to be valued in different ways (p. 12). She tries to delimit the proper 
scope of the market by identifying the norms that are characteristic of market rela-
tions, and the corresponding class of goods that are properly valued in terms of 
those norms. For Anderson, the ideal economic good is a “pure commodity.” The 
mode of valuation appropriate to pure commodities is “use.” She writes (p. 144): 
“Use is a lower, impersonal, and exclusive mode of valuation. It is contrasted with 
higher modes of valuation, such as respect. To merely use something is to subor-
dinate it to one’s own ends, without regard for its intrinsic value.” This defi nition 
immediately introduces the Aristotelian ranking of intrinsic value over instrumental 
value. Anderson is presenting market norms as a kind of second-rate morality: the 
market’s mode of valuation is lower than that of other domains of social life; it is 
merely use; it has no regard for intrinsic value. In this account, market norms are 
impersonal and egoistic. Impersonality is the idea that market transactions are viewed 
instrumentally: each party to a transaction considers it only as a means to the satis-
faction of his own ends. Egoism is the idea that those ends are defi ned in terms 
of self-interest.
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Anderson (1993) acknowledges that market norms embody a moral ideal of 
“economic freedom.” However, this ideal is presented in negative terms—as freedom 
from the kinds of moral constraints that one would face if one recognized the 
intrinsic value of goods, the obligations of personal relationships, and the potential 
validity of other people’s judgements about value (pp. 144 –146). Indeed, Anderson 
seems comfortable with the ideal of economic freedom only in the context of 
in essential but harmless consumer products. Accepting (if condescendingly) that 
“the market . . . also has its proper place in human life,” her examples of goods 
that properly belong to the domain of economic freedom are “the conveniences, 
luxuries, delights, gadgets, and services found in most stores” (166 – 67). There is 
no mention of the role of the market in supplying private goods like food, clothing, 
fuel, and shelter, on which we all depend for our survival.
Anderson (1993) develops her critique of the instrumentality of the market 
by considering the intrinsic value of the goods and services provided by profes-
sional workers such as doctors, academics, athletes, and artists. Like MacIntyre 
(1984) in his discussion of portrait painters, Anderson recognizes that professionals 
can be intrinsically motivated even though they produce for sale. But she argues 
(pp. 147–150) that the norms of the market can confl ict with “the norms of excel-
lence internal to their professional roles.” The result is that, when professionals sell 
their services, intrinsically valuable goods are “partially commodifi ed.” She does not 
claim that commodifi cation is wholly undesirable, but the thrust of her argument 
is that the internal goals of professional practices must be partially insulated from 
the extrinsic motivations that are fostered by markets. If necessary, taxpayers should 
bear some of the costs of this insulation, for example through subsidies to the arts 
and to pure research.
Sandel (2009) develops a different but complementary critique of the market, 
focusing on the virtue ethics of justice.3 Like MacIntyre, he works with a concept 
of social practices; each practice has its Aristotelian telos and its associated excel-
lences and virtues. However, Sandel’s concern is less with the cultivation of proper 
attitudes towards goods and practices, and more with how individuals are honored 
and rewarded for showing appropriate virtues. Justice, for Sandel, is about “giving 
people what they deserve.” That requires judgements about “what virtues are worthy 
of honor and reward, and what way of life a good society should promote” (p. 9).
Sandel (2009) begins his book by describing some recent issues of public 
debate in America, intended to support his claim that virtue ethics is alive and well 
in ordinary political discourse. Two of these issues concern what Sandel sees as the 
ethical limitations of the market. The fi rst issue is the conduct of those fi rms that 
charged scarcity prices for such goods as motel rooms, emergency repairs, and 
3 In a more recent book, Sandel (2012) presents an argument about the “moral limits of markets.” 
His paper in this issue takes up some of these arguments. As he acknowledges (p. 208, note 18), this 
argument is similar to that of Anderson (1993). Sandel sees economics as complicit in the inappropriate 
propagation of “market values.” Sandel is less precise than Anderson in explaining what those values are, 
but it is clear that he sees them in opposition to the civic virtues of “social solidarity,” including “shar[ing] 
in a common life,” and “car[ing] for the common good” (pp. 128, 203).
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bottled water in the aftermath of Hurricane Charley in Florida in 2004. At the time, 
some economists argued that market-clearing prices promote effi ciency in the use 
of resources, and that this truth is not invalidated by hurricanes. Sandel sides with 
the opinion that this kind of “price gouging” should be illegal. His reason is an 
application of virtue ethics: the fi rms that charged scarcity prices were motivated 
by greed; since greed is “a vice, a bad way of being,” the state should discourage it 
(pp. 7– 8). The second issue is the remuneration of senior corporate executives. 
Sandel asks whether the chief executive offi cers of large American corporations 
deserved the payments they received in the years leading up to 2008, when their 
fi rms were generating large profi ts. We are invited to conclude that effort and talent 
are qualities that are worthy of reward in business, but that when the market rewards 
executives for profi ts that are not attributable to effort or talent, a principle of justice 
is being violated (pp. 12–18). The message from both examples, developed over 
the course of the book, is that the market generates incomes that are not properly 
aligned with the virtues of the people who receive them.
To an economically trained reader, these critiques of economics and the market 
often seem divorced from the reality of everyday economic life. MacIntyre (1984) 
and Anderson (1993) seem to fi nd it hard to fi nd moral signifi cance in the ordinary 
useful jobs by which most people earn their livings. Sandel (2009) seems to fi nd 
it hard to come to terms with the fact that market rewards depend on luck as well 
as talent and effort. We will argue that virtue ethicists are failing to fi nd virtue in 
markets because they are not seeing the market as a practice in its own right.
Intrinsic Motivation and Economics
Although there is little explicit analysis of virtue in modern economics, a large 
literature in behavioral economics echoes Anderson’s (1993) argument about the 
importance of insulating intrinsic motivation from contamination by the market 
(for example, Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011). The concept of intrinsic motiva-
tion has come to economics from social psychology, and particularly from Ryan and 
Deci’s self-determination theory. That theory has strong undertones of Aristotelian 
hostility to markets. Recall that according to Ryan and Deci’s (2000) defi nition, an 
intrinsically motivated person does an activity for its inherent satisfactions rather 
than for some separable consequence; such a person is not motivated by external prods, 
pressures, or rewards. Notice how this defi nition excludes all ordinary market activi-
ties. It should be no surprise that the economic literature on intrinsic motivation 
has been seen as supporting the virtue-ethical critique of markets (for example, 
Sandel 2012, pp. 64 – 65, 113 –120).
An important hypothesis in this psychological literature is that external rewards 
can crowd out intrinsic motivation (Deci 1971; Lepper and Greene 1978); a parallel 
hypothesis in relation to social policy is due to Titmuss (1970). Titmuss’s famous 
example is the effect of introducing fi nancial incentives for blood donors. In a 
regime in which donors are entirely unpaid, blood donation is motivated by altruism, 
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reciprocity, or public spirit. If fi nancial incentives are introduced into such a setting, 
this prompts the thought that people who supply blood may be self-interested sellers 
rather than altruistic donors. This can undermine the sense of would-be donors that 
giving blood is a morally signifi cant and socially valued act, and so lead to a reduction 
in the supply of blood. A similar interpretation is now often given for the much-
discussed fi nding that fi nes for lateness in collecting children from a day-care center 
led to an increase in the incidence of lateness (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000a).
The economic implications of the hypothesis of motivational crowding-out 
were fi rst explored by Frey (1994, 1997).4 Defi ning intrinsic motivation in essentially 
the same way as Deci and Ryan do, Frey (1997, p. 2) maintains that it is “neither 
possible nor desirable to build a society solely or even mainly on monetary incen-
tives”; intrinsic motivation has an essential role to play.
Within economics, there is growing interest in theorizing about how intrinsic 
motivation can be shielded from market forces. One approach is summarized in 
the slogan “getting more by paying less.” Suppose there is some occupation, say 
nursing, in which workers are better able to provide the services that their employers 
value if they are intrinsically motivated to pursue the internal ends of that occupa-
tion—if, in Ryan and Deci’s (2000) terminology, they are attracted by its “inherent 
satisfactions” and “challenges.” Viewed in the standard conceptual framework of 
economics, a person with such a motivation for nursing has a lower reservation wage 
for working as a nurse than for working in other occupations. So employers may be 
able to separate the better workers from the worse by offering low wages—they can 
get more by paying less (Brennan 1996; Katz and Handy 1998; Heyes 2005). When a 
person accepts the low wages of an employer who is looking for intrinsic motivation, 
she signals to herself and to others that she is intrinsically motivated. So there need 
be no crowding-out effect.
 We suspect that many readers will share our unease about this argument. Nelson 
(2005) formulates this unease by raising two objections. First, because low wages 
may screen out intrinsically motivated individuals who need to support themselves 
and their families, access to intrinsically rewarding occupations may be restricted 
to people with private incomes or well-off partners or parents. Second, when social 
norms treat self-sacrifi ce as a characteristic virtue of “caring” occupations such as 
nursing, they act as a cover for, and an incitement to, exploitation. These objections 
draw attention to a questionable assumption of the “getting more by paying less” 
argument—that a person is virtuous or authentic to the extent to which that person 
is willing to sacrifi ce material rewards in the pursuit of intrinsic ends. In a model in 
which all motivations are represented as properties of individuals’ preferences, that 
assumption is almost unavoidable, since an individual’s preference for “consuming” 
4 It is only very recently that economists have taken this hypothesis seriously. Titmuss’s (1970) work 
was well-known to economists in the 1970s, but his crowding-out argument was viewed skeptically (for 
example, Arrow 1972). Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a, 2000b) discussed motivational crowding-out as 
a possible explanation of their fi ndings, but favored a more conventional economic interpretation in 
terms of incomplete contracts.
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an intrinsic good is defi ned in terms of how much of other goods she is willing to 
give up in exchange. However, it is not an essential part of a virtue-ethical approach 
in which the exercise of virtue is associated with fl ourishing rather than sacrifi ce, 
nor of a decision-theoretic approach in which intentions for mutual benefi t are 
represented as “team reasoning” (Bruni and Sugden 2008).
Folbre and Nelson (2000) suggest that the crowding-out problem can be coun-
tered by separating the payment of intrinsically motivated workers from the specifi c 
services they provide, so that payment can be construed as an acknowledgement of 
intrinsic motivation rather than as one side of a market exchange. The implication 
seems to be that authentic caring is compromised if carers and cared see their rela-
tionship as that of seller and buyer. There is another echo here of the Aristotelian 
idea that market relationships are instrumental and thereby nonvirtuous.
But how is the payment of service suppliers to be separated from exchange 
relationships? One possibility is to use gift relationships. Consider the case of restau-
rant waiters who are paid less than the market wage, but with the expectation that 
their earnings will be supplemented by tips from customers. Perhaps this practice 
supports dispositions towards friendliness and effi ciency that restaurant owners 
value in their waiters and fi nd costly to monitor, but one might think that it impairs 
rather than supports the waiter’s sense of autonomy.
A different model (and probably the one that Folbre and Nelson 2000 have in 
mind) is that of a salaried professional. Think of the role of the tenured academic in a 
well-fi nanced university, as that role used to be (and sometimes still is) understood. 
The academic is awarded tenure in the expectation of a continuing intrinsic motiva-
tion to pursue excellence in teaching and research, but is subject to only the lightest 
of monitoring. He is paid a good salary that has no direct relationship to the services 
he provides, but is seen as expressing a social valuation of the excellence that is 
expected. Actual excellence in teaching will be rewarded by the gratitude of students; 
excellence in research, by the respect of peers. This kind of separation of payment 
from services rendered can give professionals an enviable degree of autonomy; and it 
can protect whatever intrinsic motivation they have from crowding-out effects. But 
it also insulates them from pressures to respond to the interests of the people to 
whom their services are being provided. Just as the waiter loses autonomy in having 
to depend on the good will of the customer, so does the client in having to depend 
on the professional’s intrinsic motivation.
These examples illustrate the diffi culty of shielding intrinsic motivation from 
the supposedly corrosive effects of exchange relationships. These diffi culties have 
a common source: it is inherent in the concept of intrinsic motivation that an 
individual’s autonomy and authenticity are compromised whenever she enters into 
exchange relationships, but such relationships are fundamental to the workings of 
any economy that relies on comparative advantage and the division of labor. The 
literature of intrinsic motivation invites us to aspire to the ideal of an economy in 
which everyone’s actions and efforts are coordinated to realize gains from trade, 
but in which no one is actually motivated to seek those gains. This ideal seems as 
profoundly unrealistic as MacIntyre’s (1984) imaginary world of an economy built 
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on practices. If we are to reconcile the ideas of virtue and authenticity with real 
economic life, we need a way of understanding market relationships that acknowl-
edges that gains from trade are not realized by accident: they are realized because 
individuals seek them out.
The Telos of the Market
In the literature of virtue ethics, the market is seen as opposed to virtue and 
authenticity because behavior in markets fails to respect intrinsic value. Intrinsic 
value is attributed to practices in which goods are produced—for example, the prac-
tices of art, scientifi c enquiry, or nursing—as well as to nonmarket practices which 
transfer goods between individuals, like gift-giving and the honoring of excellence. 
But there is a reluctance to treat the market as a practice in its own right, with its 
own forms of intrinsic value and authenticity. We suggest that the fi rst step in a 
virtue ethics of the market is to think of the market in this way.
It must be said that economists have been partly responsible for the diffi culty that 
virtue ethicists have had in seeing the market as a practice. After all, generations of 
economists have pictured the market as a domain in which socially desirable conse-
quences emerge as unintended consequences of individuals’ pursuit of their private 
interests. Two famous expressions of this idea are due to Adam Smith (1776 [1976], 
pp. 26 –27, 456)—the assertion that “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, 
the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their 
own interest,” and the description of the merchant who “intends only his own gain, 
[but is] led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his inten-
tion.” In Smith’s theory of markets, the primary motivation for action is self-love, even 
though in fact everyone’s self-interested actions combine to create benefi ts for all. To 
say this is not to assert that Smith shared his successors’ lack of interest in virtue ethics. 
The virtues of sympathy and benevolence are important in Smith’s (1759 [1976]) 
earlier work The Theory of Moral Sentiments, even though they play only minor roles 
in his economic analysis. And for Smith, self-interest expressed within the rules of a 
commercial society is not opposed to virtue. To the contrary, character traits associated 
with the pursuit of long-term self-interest, particularly prudence, temperance, and 
self-command, are virtues (on this, see Hirschman 1997, especially pp. 18 –19). We 
take it as given that such traits are indeed virtues of economic life, but our focus will 
be on how, within a market economy, individuals relate to one another.
Can the market be viewed as a practice with its own intrinsic values? In terms 
of MacIntyre’s (1984) defi nition of practices, the market is certainly a coherent 
and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity. But does 
it have moral goods that are internal to itself? Does it have internal standards of 
excellence? From the standpoint of virtue ethics, the answer to these questions 
begins by asking: “What is the telos of the market?” For many readers (and perhaps 
particularly for those who are economists), it will be tempting to reply that the 
presupposition of the question is either false or meaningless. We ask such readers 
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to set aside their skepticism for a moment, and to translate this question into 
common-sense terms. What is the characteristic end or purpose or raison d’être 
of the market? How would you describe, in the simplest and most general terms, 
what markets do that is valuable? If you had to write a mission statement for the 
market, what would it say?
Thoughtful economists have offered answers to such questions. For example, 
Friedman (1962, p.  13) wrote that, in relation to the problem of coordinating 
economic activity, “the technique of the market place” is “voluntary cooperation of 
individuals.” Buchanan and Tullock (1962, p. 103) wrote: “The raison d’être of market 
exchange is the expectation of mutual gains.” We are not claiming here that Friedman, 
Buchanan, and Tullock are virtue ethicists. All we are attributing to them is the idea 
that markets have a point or purpose, and that that purpose is mutual benefi t. Most 
economists, faced with our questions, would probably invoke in one way or another 
the idea of mutual benefi t or gains from trade through voluntary transactions.
If economists were asked to nominate one simple diagrammatic representation 
of a market, the “Edgeworth box” would surely be one of the commonest choices, 
and the point of that diagram is to understand markets as networks of mutually 
benefi cial voluntary transactions. Edgeworth (1881, pp. 16 –17) himself, in a famous 
passage in which he declares that the fi rst principle of economics is that every agent 
is activated only by self-interest, distinguishes between “war” and “contract,” differ-
entiated by whether “the agent acts without, or with, the consent of others affected 
by his actions”; his analysis of competitive markets is presented as an analysis of 
contract. If economists were asked to nominate a theorem to represent the market 
in its best light, many would opt for the fi rst fundamental theorem of welfare 
economics, which is essentially equivalent to showing that in competitive equilib-
rium, no opportunities for mutually benefi cial transactions, however complex, 
remain unexploited. Another strong contender would be Ricardo’s (1817, Ch. 7) 
comparative advantage theorem, which shows that there are typically opportunities 
for gains from trade between any pair of countries (and by extension, any pair of 
individuals), whatever their respective endowments and productivity.
How else might one answer our question about the telos of the market? One 
obvious alternative answer is that the telos of the market is wealth creation: after 
all, the founding text of economics is called The Wealth of Nations. But even for the 
author of that text, the fundamental mechanism by which wealth is created is 
the division of labor and the extension of the market, and the division of labor is the 
consequence of the human propensity “to truck, barter and exchange one thing 
for another” (Smith 1776 [1976], p. 25). Other economists have emphasised how 
the market creates wealth by exploiting comparative advantage (Ricardo 1817), the 
division of knowledge (Hayek 1948), and increasing returns to scale (Marshall 1920, 
pp.  222–242; Arrow 1984, p.  188); but all of these mechanisms operate through 
mutual gains from trade. Another possible answer is that the telos of the market is 
economic freedom. The association between the market and freedom is a recurring 
theme in economics; famous expositors of this idea include Mill (1848 [1910]), 
Marshall (1920, p. 8), Hayek (1948), and Friedman (1962). But economic freedom 
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is not the freedom of each person to get what he wants tout court; it is his freedom to 
use his own possessions and talents as he sees fi t and to trade with whoever is willing 
to trade with him.
We suggest that the common core of these understandings of markets is that 
markets facilitate mutually benefi cial voluntary transactions. Such transactions can 
be seen as valuable because individuals want to make them, because they satisfy 
individuals’ preferences, because they create wealth, and because the opportunity 
to make them is a form of freedom. We therefore propose to treat mutual benefi t 
as the telos of the market.
Market Virtues
On the supposition that the telos of the market is mutual benefi t, a market 
virtue in the sense of virtue ethics is an acquired character trait with two proper-
ties: possession of the trait makes an individual better able to play a part in the 
creation of mutual benefi t through market transactions; and the trait expresses an 
intentional orientation towards and a respect for mutual benefi t. In this section, we 
present a catalog of traits with these properties, without claiming that our catalog 
is exhaustive.
According to the logic of virtue ethics, such traits are properly or consistently 
viewed as praiseworthy within the practice of the market, when that practice is under-
stood as directed at mutual benefi t. Thus, we should expect the traits in our catalog 
to have been evaluated favorably in the tradition of liberal economic thought from 
which we have distilled the telos of mutual benefi t. We maintain that this is the case, 
and will point to illustrative examples. Recall that virtue ethicists claim to uncover 
the virtues of practices by philosophical refl ection, and not simply by sociological 
observation. It is in the spirit of such enquiry to look to thoughtful economists as 
well as to market participants for insights into the nature of market virtues.
We will not claim that all market participants display the market virtues. (The 
logic of virtue ethics does not require that kind of implausibility: virtue ethicists can, 
for example, describe bravery as a military virtue without asserting that all soldiers 
are brave.) But we do maintain that the market virtues are broadly descriptive of 
traits that many people, including people who are successful in business, display 
when they participate in markets. Readers who are accustomed to equating virtue 
with self-sacrifi ce may suspect that this claim is overoptimistic, but we repeat that 
such an equation is alien to virtue ethics. It is fundamental to the classical and 
neoclassical understanding of markets that, under normal circumstances, each 
party to a market transaction benefi ts from involvement in it. Thus, a disposition 
to seek mutual benefi t in markets will normally incline individuals towards the 
kinds of individually benefi cial behavior that economic theory has traditionally 
described. Our account of market virtue is not a new theory of nonselfi sh behavior. 
It is a description of a distinctive moral attitude to market relationships—an attitude 
characterized not by altruism but by reciprocity.
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Universality
Our fi rst market virtue is universality—the disposition to make mutually benefi -
cial transactions with others on terms of equality, whoever those others may be. 
If the market is to be viewed as an institution that promotes the widest possible 
network of mutually benefi cial transactions, universality has to be seen as a virtue. 
Its opposites—favoritism, familialism, patronage, protectionism—are all barriers to 
the extension of the market.
It is intrinsic to the virtue of universality that market relations are not based on 
personal ties of kinship, community, friendship, or gratitude—the kind of ties that 
Anderson (1993) sees as characteristic of “higher” modes of valuation. As Smith 
(1776 [1976], p. 27) makes clear in his account of how we get our dinners, it is 
because the market is based on free horizontal relations between equals that it 
allows us to satisfy our economic needs with independence and self-respect. This 
independence can be compromised if economic transactions depend on relations 
other than mutual benefi t. However, this is not to say that market relations must 
be impersonal in the sense that each party treats the other merely as a means to an 
end. When trading partners intend their transactions to be mutually benefi cial, it 
is possible for their relations to have the characteristics of friendliness and goodwill 
that we (Bruni and Sugden 2008) describe as “fraternity.”
Friedman (1962, pp. 108 –118) identifi es another valuable aspect of universality 
when he argues that market forces tend to counter racial and religious prejudice. 
His leading example is the case of the Jews of medieval Europe, who (between 
outbreaks of outright persecution) were able to survive in a hostile social environ-
ment by working on their own account and trading with non-Jews. For Friedman, it 
must be said, universality is a desirable but unintended consequence of the pursuit 
of self-interest, rather than a virtue in our sense; but nonetheless, the customer who 
chooses where to shop on the basis of price and quality rather than the shopkeeper’s 
religion can be thought of as exhibiting a market virtue.
Enterprise and Alertness
If the telos of the market is mutual benefi t, enterprise in seeking out mutual 
benefi t must be a virtue. Discovering and anticipating what other people want 
and are willing to pay for is a crucial component of entrepreneurship. (Think 
of Freddie Laker’s pioneering of no-frills aviation, Steve Jobs’s development of 
graphical user interfaces, or Art Fry’s discovery of the commercial potential of the 
Post-it.) Successful entrepreneurship requires empathy and imagination, as Jevons 
(1871 [1970], pp. 102–103) recognized in one of the founding texts of neoclassical 
economics: “Every manufacturer knows and feels how closely he must anticipate the 
tastes and needs of his customers: his whole success depends on it.”
The virtue of alertness to mutual benefi t applies to both sides of the market: 
for mutual benefi t to be created, the alertness of a seller has to engage with the 
alertness of a buyer. Thus, the inclination to shop around, to compare prices, and 
to experiment with new products and new suppliers must be a virtue for consumers. 
Arguing that the law of one price has more application to wholesale than to retail 
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markets, Mill (1848 [1909], p.  441) wrote: “Either from indolence, or careless-
ness, or because people think it fi ne to pay and ask no questions, three-fourths 
of those who can afford it give much higher prices than necessary for the things 
they consume.” Notice how Mill’s empirical claim that well-off consumers are not 
inclined to search for the lowest prices is linked with moral criticism.
Respect for the Tastes of One’s Trading Partners
One is more likely to succeed in making mutually benefi cial transactions if one is 
disposed to respect the preferences of potential trading partners. The spirit of this virtue 
is encapsulated in the business maxim that the customer is always right. This virtue is 
closely related to the idea that market transactions are made on terms of equality, and 
opposed to the paternalistic idea that the relationship of supplier to customer is that 
of guardian to ward. It is also opposed to the idea of virtues based on intrinsic motiva-
tion, or on professional and craft standards. It is perhaps true (as MacIntyre 1984 and 
Anderson 1993 claim) that when professionals and craft workers sell their services, 
they are liable to compromise the standards of excellence that are internal to their 
respective practices, but that does not invalidate the proposition that producing what 
customers do want to buy is an aspect of a practice—the practice of the market—with 
its own standards of excellence and its own forms of authenticity. From this perspec-
tive, it is unsurprising that Smith (1776 [1976], pp. 758 –764) favored the payment of 
university teachers by their students on a fee-for-service basis—a practice that gives the 
relationship between professional and client essentially the same status as that between 
shopkeeper and customer.
In speaking of respect for the preferences of trading partners, we mean some-
thing more than the recognition that satisfying those preferences is a source of 
profi t. Consider a famous case in which this virtue is lacking. Gerald Ratner, the 
chief executive of a (then) successful low-price British jewelery business, made 
a speech in 1991 to the Institute of Directors in which he referred to his fi rm’s 
products with the joke: “People say, ‘How can you sell this for such a low price?’ 
I say, ‘because it’s total crap.’” When this was reported in the press, the business 
lost £500 million in market value and eventually had to be relaunched with a new 
name—and Ratner lost his job (Ratner 2007). Notice that Ratner was not saying, 
as suppliers of lower-priced products often and quite properly do, that what he 
was selling was cheap and cheerful and aimed at those consumers for whom value 
for money was a priority. But nor, as we understand this story, was he confessing to 
taking advantage of some lack of information on the part of his customers, and so 
failing to return their trust: the objective properties of his products were transparent 
enough. He was expressing contempt for the tastes to which his business catered, 
and thereby for the idea that the relationship between supplier and customer is 
one of mutual benefi t.
Trust and Trustworthiness
Because the monitoring and enforcement of contracts is often diffi cult or 
costly, dispositions of trust and trustworthiness (qualifi ed by due caution against 
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being exploited by the untrustworthy) facilitate the achievement of mutual benefi t 
in markets. If that is right, these dispositions must be market virtues.
The idea that markets rely on trust and trustworthiness has a long history 
in economics. Smith (1763 [1978], pp.  538 – 539) recognizes the importance of 
“probity” for the workings of markets and describes this trait as a “virtue.” Signifi -
cantly, Smith sees this virtue as consistent with long-term self-interest. He claims that 
it is most prevalent in the most commercial societies, and explains this observation 
by arguing that a reputation for probity is more valuable, the more one engages 
in trade. The idea that commercial transactions typically depend on an element 
of trust has continued to be recognized by leading economists, including Marshall 
(1920, p. 6) and Arrow (1972). Following the work of Akerlof (1982), trust relation-
ships have featured in many economic models.
A recent public discussion about the role of trustworthiness in business was initi-
ated by an open resignation letter written by a senior executive in Goldman Sachs 
and published in the New York Times. The executive, Greg Smith (2012, p. A27), 
wrote that the “culture” of Goldman Sachs had changed in a way that he could no 
longer identify with. At one time, “always doing right by our clients” had been at 
the heart of this culture, but now “I attend derivatives sales meetings where not one 
single minute is spent asking questions about how we can help clients. It’s purely 
about how we can make the most possible money off of them.” Like Adam Smith, 
and in the spirit of virtue ethics, Greg Smith argued that the virtue (or “culture”) 
of trust was not opposed to long-term self-interest: “It astounds me how little senior 
management gets a basic truth: If clients don’t trust you they will eventually stop 
doing business with you.”
Acceptance of Competition
If the telos of the market is mutual benefi t, a virtuous trader will not obstruct 
other parties from pursuing mutual benefi t in transactions with one another, even 
if that trader would prefer to transact with one or another of them instead. The 
spirit of this virtue is expressed in the “Thank you and goodbye” messages of some 
airlines, in which, before expressing the hope that its own services will be used again, 
the airline acknowledges that customers have a choice of carriers. The suggestion is 
that the airline is confi dent that its offer is better than those of its competitors and 
welcomes being put to the test of comparison.
A virtuous trader will not be motivated to seek to be protected by barriers to 
entry, or to ask potential trading partners to trade for reasons other than price and 
quality. Nor will a virtuous trader be inclined to make agreements with other traders 
on the same side of the market to restrict supply or demand, or to partition the 
market and then not compete. It might be objected that such cartel agreements are 
mutually benefi cial transactions for the fi rms that are parties to them. But they 
are not the transactions in goods and services that constitute the market, and with 
respect to which mutual benefi t is understood by those economists who see mutual 
benefi t as the telos of the market. If obstructing other parties’ transactions is nonvir-
tuous, so too is participation in cartels.
Reclaiming Virtue Ethics for Economics     157
This market virtue seems inescapable, given our approach, but there is no 
denying that traders often fi nd it hard to live by. For example, Adam Smith famously 
claimed: “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or some 
contrivance to raise prices” (1776 [1976], p. 45). Nevertheless, it is obvious from 
the tone of these and similar remarks—for example about “the wretched spirit of 
monopoly” (p. 461)—that Smith does not approve of this trait. The idea that cartel 
agreements are unethical—unworthy of a virtuous trader—is a recurring theme in 
the writings of pro-market economists. Even Friedman (1962, pp. 131–132), who 
argues that market power is not a serious problem unless it is positively supported 
by governments, approves the common law doctrine that combinations in restraint 
of trade are unenforceable in the courts.
This is a convenient place to ask whether being concerned about externalities 
resulting from one’s activities should be included among the market virtues. One 
way of posing this question is to ask whether the telos of the market is mutual benefi t 
among the parties to market transactions (considered severally), or mutual benefi t among 
everyone in a society. We suggest the former. On this view, the existence of externali-
ties can be a reason for governments to regulate markets, but self-regulation is not 
part of the internal practice of the market.5
Self-Help
Within the practice of a market that is structured by mutual benefi t, each indi-
vidual’s wants and aspirations are relevant to others only in so far as they can be 
satisfi ed in mutually benefi cial transactions. Thus, it is a market virtue to accept 
without complaint that others will be motivated to satisfy your wants, or to provide 
you with opportunities for self-realization, only if you offer something that they 
are willing to accept in return. Smith (1776 [1976], p.  45) appeals to the virtue 
of self-help or independence when, in relation to how we get our dinners, he 
writes: “Nobody but a beggar chuses to depend chiefl y upon the benevolence of his 
fellow-citizens.” (The phrase “chuses to” is important here. Smith is not denigrating 
dependence on others by people who have no other means of subsistence.)
A person who upholds the virtue of self-help will avoid asking others to reward 
her for producing goods that those others do not value. Thus, for example, an artist 
will not treat the intrinsic value of her work, as judged within the practice of art, as 
a reason to be paid by people (whether as consumers or as taxpayers) who do not 
recognize that work as benefi cial to them. Nor will she treat the self-realization that 
she achieves through that work as a reason to be paid. In this respect, the market 
virtue of self-help confl icts with the positions taken by Anderson (1993) and Sandel 
5 To this extent, we agree with Friedman (1962, pp. 133 – 36) that “social responsibility” is not a proper 
role of business. However, Friedman argues that the only responsibility of business is “to use its resources 
and engage in activities designed to increase its profi ts so long as it stays within the rules of the game, 
which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud.” Our idea that market 
virtue involves intentions for mutual benefi t is broader than this claim.
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(2009). From the perspective of market virtue, the commodifi cation of a practice is 
nothing more than its orientation towards mutual benefi t. Expecting others to pay 
for one’s preferred form of self-realization is a kind of civil (as distinct from clinical) 
narcissism. One might add a person who thinks of her interactions with others in 
terms of self-realization is treating those others as means to her own ends rather 
than as partners in a cooperative relationship.
Self-help is also opposed to self-sacrifi ce, and so to the conception of virtue 
and intrinsic motivation that underlies the idea of “getting more by paying less.” 
A relationship in which one party incurs a loss so that another person can gain is not 
a mutually benefi cial transaction between equals, and so does not express market 
virtue on either side. The motivational asymmetry of such a relationship—which 
might be revealed in the giver’s expectation of gratitude or status recognition, or in 
either party’s assumption that the recipient’s desires or interests take precedence 
over the giver’s—contrasts with the symmetry of a normal market transaction. The 
“trade not aid” slogan of the fair trade movement is an expression of the market 
virtue of self-help.
Seeing self-help as a virtue makes it easier to understand how people can fi nd 
satisfaction in work that they would not choose to do if they were not paid for it. Large 
parts of most people’s working lives are not “fun” or “challenging” in the sense of 
self-determination theory. Nor are they most naturally understood as the pursuit 
of artistic, professional, or craft excellence, or as self-sacrifi cing caring. They are 
simply activities by which one earns a living by being useful to other people in ways 
that they are willing to pay for. But that surely does not mean that these activities 
lack authenticity or virtue.
Non-Rivalry
If opportunities for mutual benefi t are to be realized, individuals must perceive 
the market as a domain in which such opportunities exist. Thus, it must be a market 
virtue to see others as potential partners in mutually benefi cial transactions rather 
than as rivals in a competition for shares of a fi xed stock of wealth or status. A disposi-
tion to be grudging or envious of other people’s gains is a handicap to the discovery 
and carrying through of mutually benefi cial transactions. The corresponding virtue 
is that of being able to take pleasure in other people’s gains—particularly those that 
have been created in transactions from which you have gained too.
As viewed in the liberal tradition of economics, the market is not the archetypal 
locus of positional competition, with success measured by relative wealth. Indeed, 
positional competition may be more typical of professions that have maintained 
some insulation from the market and have developed nonmarket institutions for 
ranking excellence, such as literary, artistic, and scientifi c honors and prizes. Perhaps 
one of the reasons why academic writers (including some economists) often fi nd it 
diffi cult to understand how markets can be structured by mutual benefi t is that 
competition in the intellectual community is so positional.
From the earliest days of economics, prominent economists have argued against 
positional understandings of market competition, and have presented nonpositional 
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attitudes as virtuous. For example, Hume (1760 [1985], pp. 327–28) argues against 
the “narrow and malignant opinion” that the relationship between commercial 
economies is that of zero-sum rivalry: “[T]he encrease of riches and commerce in 
any one nation, instead of hurting, commonly promotes the riches and commerce 
of all its neighbours.”6 Writing almost a century later, Mill (1848 [1909], pp. 581– 82) 
expresses the same sentiment: “[C]ommerce fi rst taught nations to see with good will 
the wealth and prosperity of one another. Before, the patriot . . . wished all countries 
weak, poor, and ill-governed, but his own: now he sees in their wealth and progress a 
direct source of wealth and progress to his own country.”
What about rivalry between fi rms, and in particular the case in which the 
successful entry of one fi rm into an industry squeezes out another? Even in these 
cases, the motivation of the entrant need not be positional. Indeed, even a self-
interested entrant would have no reason to want to displace an incumbent fi rm, 
except as a means of making profi t; and that profi t can be earned only through 
mutually benefi cial transactions with customers. A virtuous entrant, one might say, 
intends that the transactions he offers to make are mutually benefi cial for the parties 
that will be involved in them; the entrant does not intend or take satisfaction in the 
failure of competitors, even if that external effect is a predictable consequence of 
successful entry.
Stoicism about Reward
In a market structured by mutual benefi t, each individual benefi ts according 
to the value that other people place on their transactions with that individual. In 
terms of any defensible concept of what people deserve, this form of economic 
organization cannot consistently reward people according to their deserts. Desert 
is a backward-looking concept: what people deserve can depend on how they 
behaved in the past. But mutual benefi t, in the sense that markets can be said 
to facilitate its achievement, is defi ned in terms of people’s circumstances and 
beliefs at the time at which they trade. Because economic circumstances can change 
unpredictably, efforts that were made with reasonable expectations of return may 
turn out not to be rewarded by the market. Conversely, being in a position to gain 
from mutually benefi cial transactions with others at a particular time and place 
can involve luck as well as foresight. Sandel’s (2009) example of being able to 
benefi t from possessing the human and physical capital of a hotelier or builder 
in the aftermath of a hurricane is just an extreme case of this general feature of 
market reward. If Sandel’s interpretation of the pay of senior corporate executives 
in the pre-2008 period is that that those executives were benefi ting from the good 
luck of being able to exercise their trade in a bull market, that example illustrates 
the same point.
6 That international trade promotes peace by making nations dependent on one another was argued 
even earlier, by Montesquieu (1748 [1914], Book 20, Section 2). However, Hume is more explicit in 
arguing that trade gives each country an interest in the prosperity of its trading partners.
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To recognize this feature of markets is not to oppose all redistributive poli-
cies. Indeed, one might argue that a market economy is politically sustainable only 
if everyone can expect to benefi t in the long run from the wealth that markets 
create, and that might require some collective commitment to redistribution. But if 
the market is to function, rewards cannot be perfectly aligned with desert (Sugden 
2004, 2012). To some critics, this disconnect between reward and desert comprises 
a moral failure of the market. Sandel (2009) refers to a passage in which Milton 
and Rose Friedman (1980, pp. 136 –137) argue that this aspect of the unfairness of 
life is a price we have to pay for the freedom and opportunity that the market gives 
us. Sandel (pp. 164 –165) thinks this a “surprising concession” from advocates of 
the market. His thought seems to be that material wealth is the currency of market 
reward, and that individuals’ earnings from the market ought therefore to be in due 
proportion to effort and talent.
Of course it is true that most people value material wealth, and that, in 
this morally neutral sense, wealth is a currency of reward in the market, as it 
is in other domains of life. But an adequate account of market virtue cannot 
maintain that what a person earns from market transactions is a reward for the 
exercise of virtue, in the sense that a literary prize can be seen as a reward for 
artistic excellence. A person can expect to benefi t from market transactions only 
to the extent that she provides benefi ts that trading partners value at the time 
they choose to pay for them. To expect more is to create barriers to the achieve-
ment of mutual benefi t. Thus, market virtue is associated with not expecting to 
be rewarded according to one’s deserts, not resenting other people’s undeserved 
rewards, and (if one has been fortunate) recognizing that one’s own rewards 
may not have been deserved.
This attitude of fortitude or stoicism towards the distribution of rewards in 
a market economy is fundamental to Hayek’s (1976) account of the moral status 
of the market and “the mirage of social justice.” Hayek accepts that the market 
often fails to reward desert, but writes: “It is precisely because in the cosmos of 
the market we all constantly receive benefi ts which we have not deserved in any 
moral sense that we are under an obligation also to accept equally undeserved 
diminutions of our incomes. Our only moral title to what the market gives us we 
have earned by submitting to those rules which make the formation of the market 
order possible” (p. 94).
Conclusion
We have presented a view of the market as a domain of human life with a 
distinctive constellation of virtues. We have argued that this view of the market is 
compatible with, and to some extent implicit in, a long tradition of liberal economic 
thought. The virtues we have discovered do not, as some moral critics of the market 
might have expected, merely normalize egoism and instrumentality: they are 
genuine virtues that can be upheld with authenticity.
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We stress again that virtues are defi ned relative to practices. The traits that 
make a person good as a participant in markets need not be evaluated positively in 
all domains of human life. To acknowledge that there are market virtues is not to 
claim that the market is the only morally relevant domain, nor that the market 
virtues are the only virtues. We have argued (in agreement with some but not all 
virtue ethicists) that the virtues of different domains can confl ict with one another. 
Thus, the market virtue of universality can confl ict with loyalty to community and 
tradition. Respect for one’s trading partners’ tastes can confl ict with upholding 
standards of professional and craft excellence. The virtue of self-help, as viewed by 
a potential philanthropist, can confl ict with benevolence. Stoicism about market 
reward can confl ict with the pursuit of social justice. However, it should not be 
thought that the market virtues apply only within the practice of the market. On 
our account, the telos of the market is mutual benefi t. Thus, market virtues will 
apply in other domains of human life that are understood as cooperation among 
equals for mutual benefi t and that, as Mill (1861 [1976], pp.  29 – 30) argues, 
thereby provide the environment in which the “social feelings of mankind” can 
develop. As Mill and many later theorists of social capital recognize, market rela-
tions form one part of the network of cooperative relations of which civil society 
is made up (for example, Putnam 1993). Thus, the market virtues are also virtues 
of civil society in general.
We close with an expression of this idea by Antonio Genovesi (1765 – 67 [2005]), 
an Italian contemporary of Adam Smith who, like Smith, tried to understand the 
motivations driving the growth of commercial societies in his time and who made 
an attempt to build a theory of commercial society based on the idea of mutual 
assistance (Bruni and Sugden 2000). Signifi cantly, the name that Genovesi tried to 
give our discipline was not political economy but civil economy. We quote the fi nal 
words of his Lectures on Commerce, or on Civil Economy (Genovesi, 1765 – 67 [2005], 
our translation), delivered at the University of Naples, where he was the world’s 
fi rst professor of economics. Having taught his students how a commercial society 
works, he concludes: “Here is the idea of the present work. If we fi x our eyes at such 
beautiful and useful truths, we will study [civil economy] . . . to go along with the 
law of the moderator of the world, which commands us to do our best to be useful 
to one another.”
■ We are grateful for comments from participants at various conferences and workshops 
at which earlier versions of this paper were presented, and from the editorial team at the 
Journal of Economic Perspectives. Sugden’s work was supported by the Economic and 
Social Research Council through the Network for Integrated Behavioural Science (grant 
reference ES/K002201/1).
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